The “Perfect” Battle: A Study of Cannae and the Inspired Leadership of Hannibal Barca.

The Essays #11

The Battle of Cannae!

First off let me start with an apology, I have spent a long time away from posting on Wednesdays. I had plans to do a few reviews and I decided it against it. I hate to review things that I don’t like, but I feel more passionately about nitpicking issues with stories… so it’s very hard for me. Wanting to only post positive things… but I write better when I rant…

I am trying to get back on track, so here is a new Essay. This is another from my Military History class, and features the “perfect battle.” The second Punic War and the exploits of Hannibal Barca. I have not changed the formatting of the article, so it will have both endnotes and biblio at the end.

I should also mention that as this paper was written to pass my class, this is the final research paper it is rather lengthy, and it also had to meet certain criteria. So, the research is sound, but I had to hit certain points and technically there was a page limit, so some of my analysis could have probably gone on longer.

The Battle of Cannae 2-August-216 BCE

Throughout history much can be said about inspired leadership. How great armies lead by great men, or even small armies lead by great men, have impacted the direction of the historical narrative. Many can argue the merits and flaws of these leaders while comparing and contrasting their victories. But only one gets talked about for having the “Perfect Battle,” Hannibal Barca. In this paper, both Hannibal and the Battle of Cannae will be analyzed to show that the greatest leader is one who understands his strengths and weaknesses, and can adapt to meet any challenge.

Before diving directly into the battle, one must first understand the factors leading to it. Carthage and Rome were both major powers in the Mediterranean, and as such they were rivals for dominance. Fighting over Sicily and Sardinia formed the crux of the first Punic War, 264-241 BCE. Hannibal’s father, Hamilcar, was the general who controlled the Carthaginian forces for the last 5 years of the war in Sicily, and then continued during the Mercenary Wars that erupted in Carthage after the peace treaty with Rome was signed. Hamilcar was given a further commission to go to Spain and expand Carthaginian holdings as they had ceded Sardinia to Rome at the end of the First Punic War. A nine-year-old Hannibal would accompany his father into Spain, where he would be raised in barracks among soldiers. This education among soldiers exposed the young Hannibal to the cruelty of ancient warfare. Failed Carthaginian generals were normally crucified outside of Carthage and Hamilcar was known for his extreme punishments that he meted out on rebellious Spanish tribes. When Hannibal was eighteen his father died in battle—betrayed by tribal allies—and his uncle Hasdrubal was assigned to take over the Spanish garrisons. Hannibal became a junior officer in Hasdrubal’s army and within seven years, when Hasdrubal was assassinated, Hannibal was given command by the “acclimation of ‘the army and Catharginians.’”[1] Before the assassination of Hasdrubal, tensions with Rome had been on the rise. In 227 BC Hasdrubal had founded the city of New Carthage (modern day Cartagena) and Rome feared that Carthage planned to expand across all of Spain. In 225 BC Rome and Hasdrubal came to an agreement that Carthage would stay south of the Ebro River and Rome would stay to the north. However, Rome kept ‘diplomatic’ ties to the city of Saguntum, which lies quite far to the south of the Ebro. With Hasdrubal assassinated in 221 BC by tribal allies, Hannibal went on campaign to ‘chastise’ the rebellious tribes, including a jaunt into the north of Spain. Rome moved into Saguntum and then sent a letter to Hannibal reminding him that he wasn’t to go north of the Ebro again. They also informed him that Saguntum had requested Roman aid from raiding tribes, tribes supposedly loyal to Carthage. Hannibal sent the messenger away and then sent a letter to Carthage to ask how he should act. Rome also went to Carthage to make their demands. Hannibal took it on himself to seize Saguntum. He sieged and crushed the city in less than eight months. What followed was a Declaration of War from Rome.[2]

Hannibal began the war with a long delay and then he marched his army over the Alps in the winter, facing mass desertion and lack of forage. He also had to create roads to get his thirty elephants over the mountains. As Carthage was a city, and Empire, founded on the strength of mercantile ventures its population was mainly made up of freeman merchants, artisans, and tradesmen. They did not have a strong agrarian stock from which to pull labor or soldiers. As such it was simply a matter of good economics to hire mercenary soldiers. While Carthage did maintain a small force of home guard, the “Sacred Band” and aristocratic cavalry, the rest of its forces were made up of various hired soldiers.[3] This is the first point where one can see just what a great leader Hannibal is, with his ability to take disparate troops and use them in a grand strategy. Hannibal’s army during Cannae consisted of Spanish and Celtic (Gauls) infantry, Spanish-Gallic Cavalry, Numidian Cavalry, and Libyan-Phoenician Infantry. All of these troops differed in training, equipment, and discipline. Hannibal needed to fully understand the strengths and weaknesses of all of these forces, he needed to know the strengths and weaknesses of the men he faced as well. Hannibal also had to recruit new warriors into his army from whatever allies he found in the field. Mostly more Gauls and any Italians he could get to rebel against Roman rule. While we can never know the exact numbers of troops involved, as no historical writers ever seem to agree on the numbers. Livy and Polybius both agree on Hannibal’s forces luckily. During Cannae, Hannibal is said to have forty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry. Across the field he faced perhaps eighty thousand Romans. Polybius states a full eighty thousand infantry with six thousand cavalry, while Livy’s numbers need to be figured out by going through the casualty lists, his numbers come to sixty-five thousand infantry. What is known is that Rome raised eight full legions instead of the normal four and that each legion numbered five thousand men. These legions also marched with allies who matched them in infantry, this point is argued, but Polybius believed it true and most scholars accept his numbers. The Republic Era of Rome saw its legions divided into three lines of soldiers; the first was young raw recruits, the second was men in the prime of their lives, and the last line was battle hardened veterans. Each of these lines were then cut into blocks called maniples, and these maniples were the main tactical units of the legion. Soldiers were equipped with a variety of armors, but all had the same shields, helms, and bronze greaves. They all also carried the “Spanish sword” which was the precursor for the famous Gladius.[4] On one side we have a disciplined army arrayed by status with the same gear, same training, and same fighting style. Led by two Roman senators who are co-Consuls. On the other side is half the number of troops, lacking uniformity or any sort of combined skills, and in some cases not even able to talk to one another. Hannibal needed to meld these parts together and exploit both his strengths and his enemies’ weaknesses. He had already done it twice; would the third time be the charm?

The battle of Cannae happened two years into the Second Punic War, it was preceded by a number of stunning victories for Hannibal. Having come over the Alps the poorer for the crossing Hannibal needed time to rest and to try and recruit men to replace those who had deserted during the crossing. Hannibal managed to rest his men for a couple weeks, and hearing that there was a tribal dispute among the Gauls of the Po Valley, he approached the Taurini offering to ally, they refused, so after a three-day siege he defeated them. The other tribes in the valley then allied with Hannibal. This battle would bring Publius Scipio into the north to face Hannibal. They two would have a light cavalry exchange by the Ticinus River which would lead to Hannibal’s first victory against Rome at the Trebia. At Ticinus, Hannibal learned that his Numidian cavalry was superior to Roman as long as it struck in the flank or ran down the Romans from the rear. This would be beneficial later, as Hannibal learned new lessons from each encounter.[5]

The cavalry skirmish at Ticinus won Hannibal alliances with more tribes of Gauls and a massive influx of troops. He was at the full forty thousand troops that he would maintain until Cannae. Despite it being December, and thus the end of the normal campaign season, Hannibal needed to push south. Having so many men he needed to move to grounds with better hunting and forage, so he headed for more secure lands. But the Roman’s had not been idle while Scipio was running his cavalry battle with Hannibal, two consular armies had moved to cover the only two bridges to the southern lands. With both bridges defended, any other general would have thought himself trapped. Hannibal had a set of rules that he used to determine his strategies: The first rule was to maximize shock and surprise, the second was to engage an enemy after it was made to work hard to transit some obstacle like a river, or hill. And the third rule was to use terrain to maximum effect.[6] Hannibal needed to get across the Trebia, but an entire consular army and the remains of Scipio’s forces waited there for him. Hannibal used his eye for terrain and found a perfect spot to cross and to attack the Romans. It must be mentioned that in ancient time night movements of any sort were extremely tough. Hannibal’s plan had three preparatory steps. First, he sacked towns north of the river in order to incense Romans to cross the river and come after him. Secondly, he dispatched his younger brother, Mago, with a hand selected band of elite cavalry and infantry to move during the night into an ambush position behind Roman lines. His last step was a second night move, he sent his elite Numidian cavalry out before dawn and had them attack the camp. The shocked Romans assembled and marched across the river, with snow falling and the waters icy cold the Romans were further harassed by Hannibal’s Balearic slingers. The Roman’s lined up in their standard formation, the infantry forming a large centre and the cavalry on the wings. Hannibal would sweep away the cavalry on either side of the infantry block and hammer them with elephants. Once the Roman’s were being hammered on three sides, Mago’s thousand cavalry, each with an infantry man riding behind swept into the rear of the Romans. The Gauls at Hannibal’s centre failed, and ten thousand Romans marched through them. Oddly those ten thousand just kept marching forward until they reached Placentia. The rest of the army routed and Hannibal had his first major victory.[7]

Hannibal’s next major victory would come from the Ambush at Lake Trasimene, six months later. Hannibal still had to travel through the winter after the Battle at Trebia, and his route forced him to move his army through the marshy delta of the Arno. An area considered impassable to so large a force. Hannibal lost all but one of his remaining Elephants and also became quite ill himself, losing one of his eyes to infection. The move through the marsh placed him dangerously close to Rome and allowed him to bypass the Roman legions out hunting for him. One of the consuls, Flaminius was enraged that Hannibal had slipped past him and was “ravaging the Italian country”.[8] Flaminius chased after Hannibal, who responded by wrecking even more havoc, burning entire villages. Some argue that the burning was part of Hannibal inciting Flaminius to make mistakes while others argue that in reality Hannibal was trying to send the message to possible Italian Allies that Rome couldn’t protect them.[9] Though it is also interesting to note that at this time Hannibal may still have been sick from the infection in the Arno and was actually being carried. This is very interesting because Hannibal liked to lead his men by being amongst them, keeping discipline among his mixed troops by sheer force of personality. The fact that he could conceive of his second major victory while bed ridden is very telling to the level of his skill and intelligence. The road along the shore of lake Trasimene was alongside a wooden slope. Basically, to your right is open water and to your left is a steep hillside covered in trees. As Hannibal marched his troops through this road the Roman army was visible on his heels, they had finally closed the distance. Hannibal made camp, visibly showing that he planned to face the Romans in the morning. Once again, he knew his enemy, Hannibal broke his army into many small units and during the night sent them around and over the hills to hide in the trees up the slope. Again, night maneuvers are extremely difficult, even more so when many of your troops don’t share a language. The Carthaginian forces managed to conceal themselves along a ten kilometer stretch of the hillside. The lake was very accommodating, creating a thick fog bank with the dawn. The Romans who were forced to march in a narrow file through the fog banks. As they reached the end of the valley they could see Hannibal’s encampment, and excited to start the battle they forward. Hannibal’s forces rushed down the hillside smashing into the long column of Roman soldiers and smashed them to pieces. Many Roman soldiers were driven into the lake to drown in their heavy armor.

Cannae was a ruined stronghold that was still used by the Rome as a supply depot. Hannibal seized it and fed his army. During the two years he’d already been running around Rome, Hannibal’s biggest problem had been keeping his army fed. He had to constantly stay in motion to sack towns and continually forage. During those two years no Roman force had defeated him and he had killed or captured 43,000 soldiers and nearly half of them in a single week.[10] Before the battle of Cannae started the armies spent a few days looking at each other, moving their camps to either side of the river, and generally getting a feel for their enemy. The Roman army was led by consuls Paullus and Varro, who alternated leadership each day. Paullus was the more careful of the two, but the morning of August the 2^nd Varro was in charge. He lined his troops up in a massive square, the limited amount of space between the river and the hills meant that the maniples had to be lined up deeper instead of wider. The space between the three lines was also condescended. The Roman cavalry was put on either wing with each consul taking charge of one of the cavalry units. At Trebia 10,000 Roman Infantry had smashed through the centre of Hannibal’s lines and Varro intended to do so again. Hannibal remembered this formation as well and was also a master of terrain and understanding his enemies’ weaknesses. He knew that Varro would seek to crush him under the sheer weight of numerical superiority. That the consul had full faith in legions ability to hack through Gauls and Spanish troops. He decided to show the Roman’s exactly what they wanted. He moved his army across the river to form up opposite the Romans and he used his Gauls and cavalry to kick up dust and screen the rest of his troops movements. It also helped that the wind was blowing his dust into the faces of the Romans. As the dust settled the Romans saw a long thin line of Gauls and Spaniards mixed in loose blocks. They also saw two blocks of cavalry arrayed to face their own on the wings. The Romans weren’t very good at using cavalry at this time, most of their cavalry would actually rush up to a battle and then dismount and fight as infantry. When they did remember that they were cavalry they were also hampered by using short Greek spears instead of lances, as such they were out reached by the Spanish and Gallic cavalry in Hannibal’s army.[11] What the Roman’s didn’t see was the two large blocks of Libyan-Phoenician heavy infantry that massed at the corners of the long infantry line.

Combat at Cannae started like any Roman battle with their velites and Hannibal’s slingers running forward and launching missiles at each other. After both sides exhausted their ammo they disappeared back into the ranks of their armies. The massive main blocks of infantry started to move and the Roman’s delighted to see the ‘barbarian’ centre of Hannibal’s line bulge forward in an undisciplined mass.[12] The cavalry also moved and being quicker they closed with each other before the infantry could. The Spanish and Gallic Infantry smashed into the Roman, and instead of wheeling and light striking the two forces mired into a ‘truly barbaric’ melee.[13] The Roman cavalry broke and was driven into the river and Spanish-Gallic cavalry pursued. At this same moment the Roman infantry smashed into the bulging line of mixed Spanish and Gaul infantry. The Carthaginian line buckled and fell back under the push of the Romans. Varro exalted from his position on the left flank in the other Roman Cavalry unit. His force was being constantly attacked by the lighter Numidian cavalry and he was unaware that Paullus had fallen on the other flank. As he watched the Carthaginian main line fall back he yelled for the Roman foot to double their efforts. He wanted them to smash through the line and cut Hannibal’s army into two. The Roman legions pushed forward, excited to mete out revenge on an army that had shattered multiple legions already. What space between the lines had existed in the Roman formation was now gone, the legion had become a single massive mob pushing ever forward. At this point the Spanish-Gallic cavalry had finished off the Roman right flank cavalry and had wheeled around the entire Roman infantry. Varro soon found himself smashed between the two Carthaginian cavalry forces. Hannibal had placed himself right behind the centre, so that he could control the bulge and the fake retreat. He had lured the Romans in with his “soft” centre and as Varro’s cavalry was overrun and the consul was forced to flee the field. At this crucial moment Hannibal called out for the Gauls to push back. As the centre suddenly stiffened the Roman’s came to a standstill. The Libyan troops in their stolen Roman armor then moved from the flanks wrapped around the sides of the Roman mob. No longer a legion the mob couldn’t stop moving forward or maneuver. As the rear line tried to turn and flee the Carthaginian cavalry swept in and smashed the back. The battle then devolved into pure butchery. In just three battles, no fewer than 100,000 men had been killed, captured, or crippled.[14]

Cannae is still studied today as the “perfect battle”. Massive crippling lost to your enemy and the perfect use of the double envelopment. It should be noted that this is not the origin of the maneuver or even the first time it was employed successfully. But it is the first time that it was implemented in such a stunning manner. Studying this battle and the two that preceded it we can see several reasons for Hannibal’s success. Between being raised in the military from the age of nine to having access to many great Greek and Roman soldiers and scholars he was raised to be a great general. His rules of engagement, mentioned earlier in this paper, and the fact that he would refuse to fight unless he could have at least one of his advantages formed the core of his, and any other successful general’s strategic handbook. There is a flippant quote that says; “Hannibal created his own downfall because he killed all the poor generals and left only good behind to learn from him and then face him.”[15] Facing Hannibal the Romans started to realize that there were problems with their Maniples and the ground work for the Cohort model would take hold over the next century. The Romans also learned that cavalry was an important factor in warfare. The battle of Zama is where Hannibal would face his final defeat and it was the only battle of the Second Punic War where Hannibal had the smaller cavalry force. Though it wouldn’t be recognized until modern times Hannibal really was a master of psychology as well. He inspired rage in his opponents knowing that they wouldn’t make good decisions and that he could then exploit their mistakes. He also understood how to keep his men happy, and how to bridge the gaps between languages and cultures. Hannibal Barca is one of the greatest generals, and more importantly ‘leaders’ of any era.

“Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy, but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.”

–Sun Tzu, The Art of War

Bibliography:

Bishops, M.C. & Coulston, J.C.N., Roman Military Equipment. From the Punic Wars to the Fall of Rome. Second Edition. Exeter, UK. Short Run Press. Pub. 2006, reprinted 2013.

Charles River Editors. The Battle of Cannae: The History and Legacy of Ancient Rome’s most Decisive Military Defeat. Self-Published. Print on Demand. 6-July-2018.

Gabriel, Richard A. Hannibal: The Military Biography of Rome’s Greatest Enemy. Washington, DC. Potomac Books, Inc. 2011.

Gabriel, Richard A. The Great Armies of Antiquity. Westport, CT. Praeger. 2002.

Goldsworthy, Adrian. The Punic Wars. London. Cassel & Co. 2000.

Jacques, Charles Jean, Joseph Ardant Du Picq, and Roger J. Spiller. “Analysis of the Battle of Cannae.” In Battle Studies, 15-23. University Press of Kansas, 2017. http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.snhu.edu/stable/j.ctt1kk66h3.9.

Livy on the Battle of Cannae. 216 BC. Accessed 15-August-2018 http://www.johndclare.net/AncientHistory/Hannibal_Sources6.html

Polybius. History: Book III: 107-118. “The Battle of Cannae 216 BC.” Ancient History Sourcebook. Fordham University. https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/ancient/polybius-cannae.asp

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[1] Richard A Gabriel. Hannibal: The Military Biography of Rome’s Greatest Enemy. (Washington, DC. Potomac Books, Inc. 2011.) pp 1-14.

[2] Adrian Goldsworthy. The Punic Wars. (London. Cassell and Co. 2000). Pp 144-5.

[3] Richard A. Gabriel. The Great Armies of Antiquity. (Westport, CT. Preager. 2002.) pp 195-7.

[4] Goldsworthy. The Punic Wars. 46-7

[5] Gabriel. Hannibal. 117-9

[6] Gabriel. Great Armies. Pp 204.

[7] Composed from Livy, Polybius, Gabriel, and Goldsworthy sources.

[8] Goldsworthy. pp185.

[9] Gabriel. Hannibal. Pp 135

[10] Gabriel, Hannibal 145

[11] Gabriel. Hannibal 44-5

[12] Goldsworthy 208

[13] Polybius. History Book 3. Chapter 115.2

[14] Gabriel. Hannibal 155

[15] I can’t actually remember where I heard or read this.